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I. INTRODUCTION
In his dissent in Glossip v. Gross, Justice Breyer declared that
“[t]he arbitrary imposition of punishment is the antithesis of the rule
of law.”1 He went on to assert that, for a defendant, to be sentenced
to death was akin to being struck by lightning. 2 Such randomness
and arbitrariness in capital sentencing results from the wide
discretion granted to sentencing actors, and runs counter to the
firmly held belief that every defendant in the criminal justice system
deserves fair and just treatment.3
However, these arbitrary sentences are not limited to the capital
context; they are the result of every sentencing jury determination.4
In Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia,
juries determine a defendant’s sentence in the non-capital context.5
These sentences are the result of broad discretion and little
guidance.6 As a result, non-capital juries tend to impose sentences
that are just as arbitrary as those imposed by juries in the capital
context.7 Such arbitrary sentences run counter to the purpose of jury
sentencing and undermine the Founders’ belief that the jury is “the
only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can
be held to the principles of its constitution.” 8 Because jury
sentencing tends to produce such arbitrary and unjust results, 9
1. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2759 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 2764 (“From a defendant’s perspective, to receive that sentence, and
certainly to find it implemented, is the equivalent of being struck by lightning.
How then can we reconcile the death penalty with the demands of a Constitution
that first and foremost insists upon a rule of law?”).
3. Id. at 2759–64 (“The imposition and implementation of the death penalty
seems capricious, random, indeed arbitrary. From a defendant’s perspective, to
receive that sentence, and certainly to find it implemented, is the equivalent of
being struck by lightning. How then can we reconcile the death penalty with the
demands of a Constitution that first and foremost insists upon a rule of law?”).
4. Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Jury Sent’g in Noncapital Cases:
Comparing Severity and Variance with Jud. Sentences in Two States, 2 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 331, 332 (2005).
5. Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sent’g in Prac.: A ThreeState Study, 57 VAN. L. REV. 885, 886 (2004).
6. Nancy J. King, How Different is Death? Jury Sent’g in Cap. and NonCapital Cases Compared, 2 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 195, 198 (2004).
7. See King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332.
8.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 442 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1993).
9. King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332.
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significant revisions need to be made to the jury sentencing regime
if such a regime is to continue.
This article demonstrates that the statutory jury sentencing
scheme in each of these states contributes significantly to the
arbitrary nature of sentences imposed, as each sentencing scheme is
characterized by significant discretion for juries and a lack of
guidance as to how to wield such discretion.10 It contends that this
lack of guidance leads to arbitrary and unjust sentences that juries
ultimately do not feel responsible for imposing. 11 Instead of
accepting responsibility, 12 jurors tend to place responsibility on
other actors in the criminal justice system like the defendant, the
judge, the prosecutor, or the state.13 This trend has been analyzed
and studied in the capital context but has yet to be explored in the
non-capital context.14 In fact, numerous studies have demonstrated
that capital jurors do not feel responsible for the death sentences
they impose. 15 Instead, capital jurors are insulated from the
punishment they impose by procedural safeguards surrounding the
10. Kevin Michael Miller, Romano v. Okla.: The Requirement of Jury’s Sense
of Resp. and Reliability in Cap. Sent’g, 44 CATH. U.L. REV. 1307, 1318–19
(1995).
11 . William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Choosing Life or Death:
Sentencing Dynamics in Capital Cases, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF
THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 319 (James R. Acker, Robert M. Bohm &
Charles S. Lanier, eds. 1998).
12. Throughout this paper, I define responsibility as the sense of accountability
that jurors experience as a result of the sentence they choose to impose. This
requires an accurate understanding of what will happen to the defendant as a
result of the sentence imposed and an appreciation of their role in causing that
impact on the defendant.
13. Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 320; see also Craig Haney, Violence
and the Cap. Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and the Impulse to
Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1481 (1997) (“[M]any capital jurors
further distance themselves from the moral implications of this awesome
responsibility by maintaining the belief that someone else– typically appellate
judges–will ultimately decide the sentencing question that has been posed to
them.”).
14. King, supra note 6, at 195 (“Capital sentencing research includes extensive
study of the sentencing proceeding, the jury decision-making process, and the
influence of various factors on the outcome of the sentencing decision.” In
contrast, “relatively little attention has been devoted to jury sentencing in noncapital cases . . . .”).
15. Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 320.

26

MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC.

[40

imposition of the death penalty. This lack of responsibility stems, in
part, from the decision by each state to adopt statutory provisions
that insulate the jury from the impact of their decisions, allowing
them to feel as if they are not solely responsible for the sentence
imposed. 16 Such insulation enables jurors to enact more severe
sentences than they may otherwise enact and undermines the
credibility of the criminal justice sentencing system.17
The demonstrated lack of responsibility felt by capital jurors is
a critical issue, but it is one that effects few defendants.18 On the
other hand, the lack of responsibility that is similarly perpetuated by
state processes, and that is felt by jurors in non-capital cases, has a
significant impact on the justness and consistency of every single
jury sentence imposed throughout the country. If the goal of the
criminal justice system is to ensure sentences are reliable and
equitable, it is important to both increase procedural protections for
defendants sentenced by juries and to explicitly stress to jurors the
impact their decisions will have on the defendant. In order to truly
be sentenced by a jury of one’s peers,19 it is essential for jurors to
accept responsibility for the choice they have made and the sentence
they have imposed. By providing the jury more information and
being explicit about the court’s expectations of jurors, jurors will
have to directly face the sentences they choose to impose,
acknowledge their role in the criminal justice system, and
acknowledge their role in the life of that defendant. The solutions
proposed in this article draw on studies about promoting attentive
students in the classroom to similarly create attentive jurors. This
new approach to creating an engaged jury represents minor steps
that states can take to ensure their jury sentencing systems are
operating equitably and non-arbitrarily. While these steps are
minor, they can significantly contribute to the credibility of jury
sentences and the criminal justice system in states that continue to
regularly use sentencing juries.
16 .
Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror
Instructions in Cap. Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9 (1993) (identifying such
state action as “imposed ignorance” upon the jury).
17. See King, supra note 6, at 198; see also King & Noble, supra note 4, at
332–33.
18. Facts about the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 1, 1 (2018),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJ4PZYLE] (noting that 1472 people have been executed since 1976).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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I advance my argument in three parts. In Part I, I explore why
juror responsibility is so critical to promoting just and non-arbitrary
sentences. I further analyze the lack of responsibility felt by capital
jurors and discuss from where that lack of responsibility originates.
Part II briefly explores jury sentencing in Arkansas, Kentucky,
Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia. Because no article has
previously explored the responsibility felt by jurors in the noncapital context, I analyze the jury sentencing processes that promote
a lack of responsibility in capital cases that are also utilized in noncapital cases. I conclude that these processes in capital cases create
the feeling of a lack of responsibility in non-capital jurors as well.
Part III outlines a possible framework that would enable jurors to
feel responsible for the sentences they impose. This framework
includes efforts to increase juror activism and to increase juror
comprehension. I conclude that unless such changes are made, jury
sentences for felons will continue to be arbitrary and will continue
to cast doubt on the credibility of the sentencing jury that was
intended to contribute to the Nation’s “peace, liberty, and safety.”20
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF JUROR RESPONSIBILITY
At the time the Bill of Rights was drafted, the jury was
considered critical to prevent governmental overreach and abuse.21
They were responsible for determining guilt or innocence and based
on that determination a sentence automatically flowed, making
jurors “de facto sentencers.”22 Through time, the prominence of the
sentencing jury has diminished23 with only six states still regularly
utilizing a sentencing jury. 24 In these states that regularly use
sentencing juries, the actions the juries take have a significant
impact on defendants. In these states, jurors remain the bulwark
against governmental oppression, and their participation is critical
to ensuring sentences are not arbitrarily imposed. 25 In order for
juries to serve such a function, it is critical that jurors feel
20. See President Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801).
21. Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 168 (2009).
22. Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law,
Too Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 692 (2010).
23. See id. at 694 (“Over time, a different division of labor evolved between
judges and juries: juries decided liability; judges sentenced.”).
24. King & Noble, supra note 5, at 886.
25. Oregon, 555 U.S. at 168.
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responsible and accountable for the sentences they impose. If jurors
do not feel responsible for the sentences they impose, and if they do
not recognize the significant power they wield, they will be more
likely to apply a sentence to a defendant based on a factor that does
not speak to the defendant’s ultimate criminal culpability. 26 Such a
decision would be constitutionally impermissible, as it would lead
to the arbitrary application of punishment. The arbitrary application
of punishment has been well documented in the capital context.27 In
fact, it is what led the Supreme Court to temporarily hold the death
penalty unconstitutional in 1972.28 Here, I explore the importance
of juror responsibility as a bulwark against governmental
oppression and as the last defense against the arbitrary imposition
of punishment. Additionally, I explore the problem that arises when
jurors in the capital context do not feel responsible for the sentences
they impose. I evaluate several studies that suggest capital jurors do
not feel responsible for the sentences they impose, and I explore
why that is likely the case.
A. Why Responsibility Is So Important?
In Oregon v. Ice, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized “the jury’s
historic role as a bulwark between the State and the accused at . . .
trial . . . .”29 This role has its roots in the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. 30 Such a role requires active
participation by the jury to prevent governmental oppression. In its
most basic form, it requires that the jury understand the facts and be
able to apply the law to those facts. Only when they are able to do
so both during trial and sentencing can they truly impose just
sentences that are not based on arbitrary or impermissible factors.
By understanding the awesome weight of such a role in the criminal
justice system, the jury accepts responsibility for their verdict and
is more likely to base their decisions on the defendant’s criminal
culpability while taking account of all mitigating factors that pertain
to such culpability.31 In this section, I further analyze the jury’s role
26. King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332–33.
27. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 274 (1972); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 322 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
28. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40.
29. Oregon, 555 U.S. at 168.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
31. See Haney, supra note 13, at 1485–86.
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as a bulwark against governmental oppression and I discuss how the
failure to accept responsibility leads to arbitrary and unjust
sentences.
1. Jurors Exist as a Bulwark Against Governmental Oppression
The right to a trial by jury is engrained in the Sixth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. 32 As a result, juries have long
been perceived as a bedrock of American democracy and as a
bulwark against the unjust infringement of a defendant’s rights.33 A
jury of one’s peers is supposed to represent a fair cross section of
the community and ensure that unjust and harsh sentences are not
imposed arbitrarily.
However, in order for a jury to function effectively, a jury must
have the information and resources they need to find the facts and
apply the law. 34 “[F]or a jury to effectively convey the moral
condemnation of the community in a criminal case . . . the jury must
be provided with tools . . . to adequately and competently exercise
its responsibility.” 35 By preventing the jury from receiving such
resources, the state is placing paternalistic limitations on the jury.36
The application of such limitations on the jury creates the
presumption that such limitations are necessary for the jury to act
appropriately and suggests that “the jury is unable to shoulder the
responsibility of governing the decisionmaking [sic] process.”37 If
the jury is unable to bear this responsibility, then it is the
government that is really making sentencing decisions. Thus,
instead of a jury of the defendant’s peers protecting him from
governmental overreach, the jury yields to the entity from whom
they are supposed to be protecting the defendant. This sentencing
structure results “in a reduction in the moral authority that supports
the process.” 38 To combat such a reduction and to ensure the
purposes of the Sixth Amendment are effectuated, it is critical that

32. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
33. Oregon, 555 U.S. at 168.
34. Steven I. Friedland, Legal Institutions: The Competency and Responsibility
of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 190, 192 (1990).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 207 (quoting In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d
1069, 1093 (3rd Cir. 1980)).
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jurors are explicitly informed of their responsibility and the impact
their decision will have on the defendant.
2. Arbitrary Results
Procedural safeguards, like jury instructions, are intended to
ensure that the sentences imposed are just, rather than arbitrary or
capricious. Such procedural safeguards exist to guide juries in both
the capital and non-capital context. While these safeguards are
given special emphasis in the capital context, they are inadequate in
both the capital context and the non-capital context to combat the
potentially arbitrary decisions that result.
In the capital context, the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized
that procedural safeguards are intended to help avoid the arbitrary
application of the death penalty, to guide the jury during sentencing,
and to allow the jury to understand the weight of their decision.39 In
fact, in Furman v. Georgia, when the death penalty was briefly ruled
unconstitutional, it was because the death penalty was being applied
in an impermissibly arbitrary manner. 40 There, the U.S. Supreme
Court looked to state death penalty statutes and concluded that they
provided too much unfettered discretion to capital juries. 41 This
unguided discretion was said to be the cause of arbitrary and
capricious death penalty decisions.42
The same unfettered discretion that existed among capital juries
when the death penalty was ruled unconstitutional in 1972 also
exists today in the non-capital context.43 “Juries in non-capital cases
face wide-open choices that seem to allow even more room for
arbitrary, even discriminatory, decision-making than is available in
the choice between life and death.” 44 The risk of arbitrary
sentencing in non-capital cases should be of a similar level of
concern as the risk in capital cases, especially given the additional
protections that have been adopted in the context of the death
penalty and have not been adopted in a non-capital context.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Miller, supra note 10, at 1312.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 274.
Id. at 298.
Miller, supra note 10, at 1319.
King, supra note 6, at 200.
Id.
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Granted, this argument may conflict with the “death is
different,” 45 refrain that motivates significant procedural
protections and scrutiny in the death penalty context. However,
because a significant liberty interest is implicated by prison
sentences as well, arbitrary decision-making should remain a
concern of the Court just as it is in the capital context. Asserting
otherwise would undermine the entire criminal justice system and
contradict the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 46 Arguing that
arbitrary decision-making should not be a concern of the non-capital
punishment system would be equivalent to suggesting that juries
should have free reign to consider any factor or no factors at all in
their decision-making process—akin to allowing the jury to flip a
coin to decide the length of sentence a defendant must serve. The
criminal justice system loses all credibility if it allows juries to
reduce the choices they are asked to make to a simple coin toss. This
sentiment was echoed by Justice Clark in Gideon v. Wainwright
when he asserted that
[t]he Fourteenth Amendment requires due process of law for the
deprival of ‘liberty’ just as for the deprival of ‘life,’ and there cannot
constitutionally be a difference in the quality of the process based
merely upon a supposed difference in the sanction involved.47

Thus, even though, “death is different,” 48 an abridgment of
liberty should not occur arbitrarily. Instead, the jury’s discretion
should be limited to consideration of the legal factors before them.
To truly limit their discretion to those factors, it is critical to
communicate the expectations of the court and the law clearly and
unambiguously. This need has been uniquely demonstrated by
studies demonstrating a lack of juror responsibility in the capital
context, but the same lack of responsibility also is present in the
non-capital context.

45.
46.

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(1)(3) (U.S. SENTENCNG COMM’N 2018) (“Granting such broad discretion, however, would have risked
correspondingly broad disparity in sentencing . . . . Such an approach would have
risked a return to the wide disparity that Congress established the Commission to
reduce . . . .”).
47. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349 (Clark, J., concurring).
48. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188.
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B. A Lack of Juror Responsibility in the Capital Context
For a capital sentence to be applied justly rather than arbitrarily,
jurors must have a sense of responsibility for the awesome power
that they wield. Jurors are literally making a life or death decision
upon which the defendant’s fate rests. Numerous studies have
suggested that if they do not understand the significance of their
decision, they are likely to make their decision based upon a number
of different factors that may or may not pertain to the defendant’s
ultimate culpability. 49 They may even approach the sentencing
phase of the defendant’s trial with a presumption of death on their
mind.50 If jurors allow such irrelevant factors to impact the sentence
they impose, their decision will be marked by the same arbitrariness
that led the Supreme Court to briefly hold the death penalty
unconstitutional in 1972.51 Thus, if the death penalty is to continue,
sentences must be imposed in a non-arbitrary manner, in which
jurors accept responsibility for the sentences they impose. In this
section, I analyze this problem and evaluate several studies that
suggest capital jurors do not feel responsible for the sentences they
impose. I additionally explore why that is likely the case, and what
factors help insulate capital jurors from the decisions they make.
1. Empirical Analysis Demonstrating Capital Juries Do Not Feel
Responsible for the Sentences They Impose
In Caldwell v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court held that the
reliability of a “death sentence depends upon the jury taking its role
seriously.”52 This holding was narrowed in Romano v. Oklahoma.53
There, the Court limited Caldwell to instances in which the jury was
intentionally misled about their responsibility for the sentence they
chose to impose.54 Regardless of the Court’s limitation of Caldwell
49. See Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 320; see also Haney, supra note
13, at 1481; see also King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332.
50. Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 318.
51. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 274; see also Miller, supra note 10, at 1347 (“A
jury with a diminished sense of responsibility cannot make a fair and reliable
determination to impose the death penalty.”).
52. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329 (1985); see also Miller,
supra note 10, at 1331.
53. Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 3 (1994).
54. Id.
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in Romano, the moral of both cases is clear: the jury’s sense of
responsibility was required for a sentence to be credible.
Study after study shows, though, that capital jurors do not feel
this sense of responsibility. 55 In fact, in a study of Oregon jurors in
capital cases, “fully one-half of the Oregon jurors did not believe
that the death penalty would actually be carried out.” 56 This
misunderstanding by Oregon jurors was likely a result of the Oregon
capital sentencing scheme which requires jurors to simply answer
several questions about aggravating and mitigating circumstances
to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed.57 These
questions allow jurors to characterize their interactions with the
defendant as “not sentencing him to death,” but rather “just
answering these questions.”58
This problem is not unique to Oregon. Instead, nationally,
among capital jurors, “there was a tendency. . .to shift or abdicate
responsibility of the ultimate decision – to the law, to the judge, or
to the legal instructions – rather than grapple personally with the life
and death consequences of the verdicts they were called upon to
render.”59 As this study suggests, it is much easier for a capital juror
to blame the law or to see the law as the force driving the
defendant’s punishment, rather than acknowledging that the driving
force was the verdict they reached by their own free will. 60 A
subsequent study found that “overwhelmingly, jurors deny that they
are primarily responsible for the defendant’s punishment.”61 In fact,
“eight of ten jurors assign foremost responsibility to the defendant
(46.6%) or to the law (35.2%).”62
Beyond those who explicitly assign responsibility for the death
sentence they choose to impose to other institutional factors or
55. Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 320; Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, No More Tinkering: The American Law Institute and the Death Penalty
Provisions of the Model Penal Code, 89 TEX. L. REV. 353, 402 (2010).
56. Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 320.
57. Id.; see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 55, at 404 (“Casting the decision
in terms of aggravation and mitigation and requiring jurors to balance or weigh
these considerations might false convey to the jurors that their decision is a
mechanical or mathematical one, rather than one requiring moral judgment.”).
58. Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 320.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 329.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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actors, it is also important to note that in one study fifty-four percent
of capital jurors acted upon a “presumption of death” in which they
believed the appropriate punishment was death unless they could be
persuaded otherwise.63 In these cases, the presumption of death was
a result of the prosecutor’s charging decision and the death
qualification of the jury. Such processes left the jury thinking
imposing a death sentence is “what we were there for.” 64 Such a
presumption necessarily abdicates jurors of responsibility. When
half of the jury believes the answer is death before they even hear
the case for life, it is easy for them to not accept responsibility for
the life they chose to take. The ease of that abdication of
responsibility is a result of the procedures in place that allow capital
jurors to insulate themselves from the plight of the defendant.
2. Why Capital Juries Do Not Feel Responsible for the Sentences
They Impose
Capital jurors do not feel responsible for the sentences they
impose because they are not made to. States take little to no action
to impress upon jurors the weight of their decision and the impact it
will have on the defendants. 65 Thus, jurors are able to remain
inactive and unengaged throughout the duration of the sentencing
proceeding. This inactivity allows jurors to dissociate from the
sentences they impose, 66 and it allows jurors to assign the
responsibility for their decision to more active sentencing actors
with more experience in the criminal justice system, like the
prosecutor or judge. 67 In addition to assigning responsibility
elsewhere, jurors are insulated from the decisions they make by
unclear and ambiguous jury instructions.68 Because jurors are not
provided the information they need and the expectations of the court
are not clearly expressed to them, they are forced to make decisions

63. Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 318.
64. Id.
65. Haney, supra note 13, at 1449 (States are incentivized to take little action
because by not insulating jurors from the weight of their decision “a system of
democratically administered death sentencing would not be possible.”).
66. See Friedland, supra note 34, at 192.
67. Haney, supra note 13, at 1481.
68. Id. at 1484 (“badly framed and poorly understood instructions seem to
provide jurors with a protective shield that enables them to avoid a sense of
personal responsibility for their decisions.”).
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for which they do not grasp the severity. I discuss each of these
abdication methods in turn below.
a. The Shifting of Responsibility to Other Actors
Jurors in capital cases are provided every opportunity to
abdicate responsibility for the sentences they choose to impose and
to shift that responsibility to other actors in the criminal justice
system, and in fact, “most capital jurors [do] disclaim primary or
sole responsibility for the awesome life or death decision they
make.”69 Because capital sentencing involves many different actors
and the process is rather complicated, it is relatively easy for jurors
to shift responsibility to someone else in the criminal justice
system.70 “The result, critics assert, is a capital sentencing system
that makes sentences at once unreliable and too easy to impose.”71
If jurors are looking to assign responsibility to another actor, they
have many options to choose from. They can blame the defendant
for setting off the sequence of events that led to the crime being
committed, the defendant being charged, and the defendant being
eligible for death.72 They can blame the prosecutor for charging the
defendant capitally and advocating for the death penalty.73 They can
blame the judge—appellate or otherwise—for being the final actor
who accepts and finalizes the sentence.74 Jurors may even look to
the law itself and argue that the death sentence they imposed was
mandatory.75 In fact, “many capital jurors readily acknowledge the
sense in which condemning someone to death is ‘not really my
decision, it’s the law’s decision,’ and they come to believe they are
just following orders.”76 This argument is most often a result of a
misunderstanding based on ambiguous and unclear jury
instructions.77
69. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility in Capital Sentencing:
An Empirical Study, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 339, 340 (1996); see also Bowers, supra
note 11, at 329.
70. Eisenberg et al., supra note 69, at 340.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 341.
73. Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 329–30.
74. Haney, supra note 13, at 1481.
75. Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 329–30.
76. Haney, supra note 13, at 1484.
77. Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 329–30.

36

MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC.

[40

b. The Inadequate Resources and Information Provided to Jurors
The resources provided to juries to help them make their
decision contributes to the jury’s tendency to shift responsibility to
elsewhere, further allowing them to insulate themselves from the
decision they make and the sentence they impose. For example, jury
instructions are often unclear and written in ways that laymen would
not readily comprehend. 78 Furthermore, studies suggest that
ambiguous or unclear jury instructions contribute significantly to
jury confusion about the meaning of life without parole, parole, and
good time.79 In Oklahoma and Missouri, jurors are not told at all
whether the defendant will be parole eligible.80 In Texas, jurors are
told that while parole exists, they may not consider the manner in
which parole would be applied to the defendant, and they are given
no clarification as to what that actually means for their decisionmaking process.81 In State v. Torrence, the South Carolina Supreme
Court went so far as to prohibit the trial judge from instructing jurors
about possible alternatives to a death sentence, like life without
parole.82 Instead, the court held that the jury may only be told that
the terms life imprisonment and death are to be understood by their
ordinary meaning. 83 Because jurors do not know what these
instructions mean, jurors regularly believe the defendant will be
released much earlier than he or she actually will be. 84 This
misunderstanding leads them to impose harsher punishments than
they may otherwise in order to fully incapacitate the defendant.85
Death-qualified juries would often rather sentence someone to death

78. Haney, supra note 13, at 1483; Johnson, Too Often Juries Comprise 12
Confused Men (and Women), THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 14, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/books-and-arts/2018/04/13/too-often-juriescomprise-12-confused-men-and-women [https://perma.cc/6WV8-DVJ7].
79. King, supra note 6, at 207; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 55, at 402–03
(“Jurors tend to misunderstand the consequences of a life without parole verdict,
and, in jurisdictions that that permit the alternative of life without parole verdict,
jurors consistently understate the length of time a defendant will remain in prison
if not sentenced to death.”); Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 7.
80. King, supra note 6, at 209.
81. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 37.07
82. Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 16, at 8.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 7–8.
85. King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332.
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than risk a defendant being released decades later.86 Such a concern
is misguided, though, as it is primarily fueled by juries either not
being told or simply not understanding that life without parole, truly
means life without parole.87
Additionally, jury instructions are often unclear as to whether
the jury’s decision is actually binding on the court. Jury instructions
may refer to the sentence the jury chooses to impose as a
“recommendation,” which suggests to the jury that their decision is
not binding, when, in reality, they are making a binding
recommendation. 88 This misunderstanding often leads juries to
“overestimate the extent to which their sentencing decisions will be
modified or corrected.”89 It also leads jurors to believe that no one
will actually be executed as a result of the sentence they choose to
impose.90 If jurors do not believe executions will be the result of
their decision, then they may perceive no difference between life
without parole and the death penalty, and may choose to impose the
death penalty to send a stronger message to the defendant and to the
community.91 Finally, the very sentencing guidelines that are meant
to aid sentencing actors actually help insulate capital juries from the
death sentences they impose.92 Because they provide jurors with a
formula for the “correct” punishment, jurors can feel as though their
decision is simply a formality that requires little consideration. 93
Their decision is reduced to simply checking a box, and it is not one
that requires the jury to feel anything in regards to the defendant. It
allows them to remain detached.

86. See Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 321.
87. See David Bruck, Simmons v. South Carolina (1994), in DEATH PENALTY
STORIES 364–65 (John H. Blume and Jordan M. Steiker, eds. 2009) (“In
California, for example, where the jury’s non-capital sentencing verdict itself
read life imprisonment without possibility of parole only about one-fifth of
former trial jurors interviewed by the Capital Jury Project believed that a
defendant who received such a sentence would actually spend his whole life in
prison.”); see also BENJAMIN FLEURY-STEINER, JURORS’ STORIES OF DEATH:
HOW AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY INVESTS IN INEQUALITY (2004).
88. Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 329.
89. King, supra note 6, at 207–08.
90. Eisenberg et al., supra note 69, at 358.
91. See Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 16, at 7.
92. Eisenberg et al., supra note 69, at 348.
93. Haney, supra note 13, at 1484.
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These factors that allow capital jurors to avoid responsibility for
the sentences they impose also exist in the non-capital context, and
they allow non-capital jurors to avoid responsibility for the
sentences they choose to impose. The “imposed ignorance” of juries
and the endemic lack of information provided to juries is prevalent
throughout the criminal justice system.94 Thus, it would be an easy
inference to say that the same factors that allow a capital juror to
avoid responsibility for the sentences they impose, similarly allow
a non-capital juror to avoid responsibility for the sentences they
impose.
III. A LACK OF JURY RESPONSIBILITY IN THE NON-CAPITAL
CONTEXT
Today, only six states routinely use juries to sentence noncapital felons: Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas,
and Virginia. 95 While each state’s jury sentencing scheme is
somewhat unique, each system does grant wide discretion to jurors.
Additionally, each system fails to effectively guide the discretion
that is granted to jurors. In that regard, the non-capital sentencing
systems are reflections of the capital sentencing systems, discussed
above, in which there is a demonstrated lack of jury responsibility.
This lack of responsibility is due in large part to procedural
protections adopted in both the capital and non-capital context to
insulate jurors from the choices they make.96 This insulation and the
lack of responsibility that results is critical to the state securing
harsher sentences for defendants.97
Here, I briefly discuss jury sentencing procedures in the states
that routinely use juries to sentence non-capital felons.
Additionally, I explore how these non-capital sentencing
procedures are similar to capital sentencing procedures and discuss
the deficiencies in both systems.

94.
95.
96.
97.

Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 16, at 9.
King & Noble, supra note 5, at 886.
Haney, supra note 13, at 1454.
King, supra note 6, at 207; King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332.
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A. Jury Sentencing in Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma,
Texas, and Virginia
The sentencing schemes of these states are marked by a lack of
information provided to the jury. Even when jury instructions are
given, they are often provided in an unnecessarily complicated form
that lacks explanations or definitions the jury may need to make
their determination.98 This lack of clarity tends to have a significant
impact on the sentences jurors choose to impose. The information
gap that this lack of clarity propagates has its roots in the laws and
jury instructions of each state.99 In fact, “not one state gives the jury
true price-setting authority today, complete with both the power and
the information needed to set the upper and lower bounds of
punishment within legislated ranges.”100 The most important pieces
of information that are kept from jurors are the sentencing
guidelines, information about parole and good time credit, and the
reality of what their verdict will actually mean for the defendant. I
discuss each in turn below.
1. The Denial of Sentencing Guidelines
In the non-capital context jurors are often denied access to the
state’s sentencing guidelines, instead, they are given only broad
statutory sentencing ranges.101 For example, in Arkansas, Virginia,
Kentucky, and Missouri juries are explicitly denied access to the
sentencing guidelines. 102 This leaves jurors with “no
comprehension that the going rate for a given offense was often
much lower than the statutory range jurors were given.” 103 This
causes jurors to apply much harsher sentences than might otherwise
98. Johnson, supra note 78.
99. King & Noble, supra note 5, at 888 (“State law in each of these three states
deprives the jury of either full information or power, to varying degrees.”).
100. Id. at 953.
101. When I refer to sentencing guidelines, I refer to the individual state’s
sentencing guidelines because those are the guidelines that impact the greatest
number of defendants.
102. King, supra note 6, at 210; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-97-101 (2018);
2 Arkansas Model Jury Instructions – Criminal AMCI 2d 9102 (2018); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-298.01 (2018); 1 Cetrulo, Kentucky Instructions to Juries § 12.11
(2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 557.036 (2018).
103. King, supra note 6, at 210.
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be applied by a judge because judges are provided guidelines ranges
that narrow the statutory range of punishment available to the
defendant.104 This trend was analyzed in a study by Nancy King that
compared the sentence severity and variance of juries and judges in
non-capital cases.105 In that study, in Arkansas for certain types of
crime, the average jury sentence exceeded both the average bench
sentence and the average sentence associated with a guilty plea.106
Specifically, “when comparing cases resulting in incarceration for
manufacturing a control substance, bench trial sentences averaged
95 months while jury trial sentences average 11 years longer—233
months.” 107 This same trend was also shown to be the case in
Virginia where defendants convicted of possession of a drug with
intent to distribute received, on average, a jury sentence of fiftythree months (four years and five months) more than defendants
who were sentenced by a judge. 108 Additionally, a 2001 Virginia
study found that “less than one-third of sentences after jury trial fell
within guidelines recommendations, as compared to 80 percent of
bench and plea dispositions combined.”109
By refusing to provide jurors with the sentencing guidelines,
states force jurors to take a stab in the dark as long as they remain
within the statutory range.110 In Oklahoma, the statute outlining jury
sentencing procedures does not explicitly discuss whether juries
should be supplied with sentencing guidelines.111 Instead the statute
only provides that juries should “assess and declare the punishment
in their verdict within the limitations by law, and the court shall
render judgment according to such verdict.”112 While the Oklahoma
statute avoids the issue all together, the drafters of the Texas statute
specifically contemplated providing juries with such information,
but the Committee for Rules “concluded that it could draft no
instruction that would be of practical value to jurors” because such
an instruction would be too dense for jurors to be able to
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332.
Id. at 344
Id.
Id.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 354.
King, supra note 6, at 210.
OKLA. STAT. § 926.1 (2018).
Id.
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understand. 113 Texas justified this decision by arguing that the
constitution does not mandate that a jury instruction actually guide
the jury’s decision.114 Because jurors often do not know what the
sentencing guideline for the defendant is and because their
discretion is in no way limited, they are left to assess the defendant’s
criminal culpability without knowing the going rate for the
defendant’s criminal conduct, and studies show that they tend to
sentence more harshly because they do not have that guidance.115
2. Denial of Information about Parole and Good Time Credit
Furthermore, states deny jurors information about parole and
good time credit. 116 Study after study shows that jurors do not
understand parole, life without parole, or good time credit. 117
Without accurate information in this regard, jurors are left with the
impression that defendants will be released from prison much
earlier than they actually will.118 As a result, jurors tend to err on
the high side of the statutory sentencing range to lessen the
possibility the defendant will be released for their crime any earlier
than the jury deems appropriate.119 This was evident in Arkansas
where the sentencing actor was the most significant variable in
determining the sentence for home burglary.120 There, a defendant
sentenced by a jury received on average an additional 133 months
compared to what a defendant sentenced by a judge received. 121
This utter confusion about parole and good time is perpetuated in
Arkansas, Kentucky, and Oklahoma where such information is
denied to jurors. 122 Similarly, while the Texas sentencing
113. Texas Criminal Pattern Jury Charges CPJC § 12.1 (2018).
114. Id.
115. King, supra note 6, at 210; see also King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332.
116. Bruck, supra note 87, at 364–65.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.; Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 16, at 9; King & Noble, supra note 4,
at 332.
120. King & Noble, supra note 4, at 348
121. Id.
122. See 2 Arkansas Model Jury Instructions -Criminal § AMCI 2d 8000; see
also 1 Cetrulo, Kentucky Jury Sections § 12.11 (2018); OKLA. STAT. § 926.1
(2018); Oklahoma Jury Instructions: OUJI-CR § 10-21.
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instructions briefly address both parole and good conduct, they does
so vaguely. 123 They do not provide jurors any information or
statistics about how much of their sentence defendants tend to
serve. 124 The instructions also do “not permit the introduction of
evidence on the operation of parole and good conduct time lines.”125
Such sentencing schemes motivate juries to apply higher sentences
than they would otherwise apply so as to ensure the retributive and
incapacitation purposes of the punishment are fully realized prior to
the defendant being released.126
3. Denial of What a Sentence Means for the Defendant
In addition to being denied information about what will happen
to the defendant once they are imprisoned, jurors are also denied
information about what will be the likely result of the sentence they
choose or do not choose to impose. For example, in Kentucky,
traditionally the jury recommended to the court whether the
sentence should be served concurrently or consecutively. 127
However, no jury instruction was given to the jury to explain what
those distinctions mean.128 Additionally, while Kentucky’s statute
termed the jury’s decisions a recommendation, this
“recommendation” was binding on the court.129 Likewise, there is
considerable confusion among jurors regarding what happens when
a unanimous opinion is not reached.130
For example, while in Missouri, a non-unanimous sentence
results in the court determining the sentence that should be
served,131 in Texas and Virginia, a non-unanimous jury requires the
court to impanel another jury and try the case a second time.132 The
Texas and Virginia rules are consistent with what most jurors
123. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. § 37.07 (2018).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Bruck, supra note 87, at 364–65; King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332.
127. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.055 (2018).
128. 1 Cetrulo, Kentucky Instructions to Juries, Criminal § 12.11 (2018).
129. Id.
130. See FIEURY-STEINER, supra note 88.
131. MO. REV. STAT. § 557.036 (2018).
132. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. § 37.07 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2295.1 (2018).
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understand the reality of a non-unanimous decision to be, but the
Missouri rule challenges jurors preconceived notions of what a nonunanimous decision means, and the jury instructions utilized in
Missouri do not adequately communicate this unique feature.133 The
misunderstanding that is created by Missouri’s statute ultimately
leads some jurors to concede rather than proceed as a hung jury
because they do not want the case to be tried again. 134 Such
concessions are based on faulty premises, but Missouri does little to
correct such misunderstandings because the sentence they seek is
secured.135
B. Non-Capital Sentencing Procedures and Capital Sentencing
Procedures are Similarly Designed and Similarly Motivated
This trend of a lack of information and clarity in jury
instructions for non-capital juries also exists in the capital context.
In fact, “jury sentencing in non-capital cases appears to share
several features of death sentencing by jury that capital punishment
critics have long condemned.”136 These shared features include an
inactive and unengaged jury and a significant information gap
between what the court expects jurors to understand and what they
actually understand. In both the capital and non-capital context,
these features contribute to arbitrariness in sentencing. These
commonalities and the procedural mechanisms that promote them
allow jurors to abdicate any sense of responsibility they may feel
for the sentences they choose to impose, regardless of the potential
sentence.137
Like jurors in the capital context, there is no real incentive for
jurors in the non-capital context to feel responsible for the sentences
they impose. They are meant to be neutral arbiters. However, by
allowing jurors to be inactive arbiters, the court is communicating
to jurors that they do not have to act as responsible individuals.
Jurors are told to “just listen,” but just listening cannot be effective
when the average attention span for a middle-aged adult is a mere

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

MO. REV. STAT. § 557.036 (2018).
See FIEURY-STEINER, supra note 88.
See id.
King, supra note 6, at 214.
Haney, supra note 13, at 1484.
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eight seconds.138 By requiring jurors to just listen and preventing
them from actively engaging, jurors, in both the capital and noncapital context, are able to avoid responsibility for the sentences
they impose. This lack of engagement is considered a significant
problem throughout the criminal justice system, particularly in the
grand jury context.139 This problem is the reason jurors on the grand
jury are encouraged to actively engage with the issue before them
by asking questions of the witnesses to determine whether an
indictment is appropriate.140
Furthermore, there is a significant information gap between
what the court expects jurors to understand, what the court
understands, and what jurors actually understand. The court
assumes a certain level of sophistication of its jurors, but the
information gap that exists prevents jurors from securing the
information they need to adequately and accurately sentence a
defendant. Jurors lack important information that judges, who are
more sophisticated, do not lack. This often leads to defendants
arbitrarily receiving harsher sentences from juries than from
judges. 141 This information gap is largely a result of a lack of
training and clear information for both capital and non-capital
jurors.
In a study conducted by Nancy King, this information gap
between judges and jurors played a significant and similar role in
both capital and non-capital sentencing. 142 For example, while
jurors in both settings lack information about parole, good time, and
concurrent and consecutive sentences, judges have that information
by nature of their positions and education.143 The jury’s lack of a
legal education creates a significant hurdle for jurors as they attempt
to understand the instructions they are given. 144 “Several studies
have suggested that jurors do not understand either the words used

138. Kevin McSpadden, You Now Have a Shorter Attention Span Than a
Goldfish, TIME (May 14, 2015), http://time.com/3858309/attention-spansgoldfish/ [https://perma.cc/VJD4-HE6U].
139. Friedland, supra note 34, at 205.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 195; see also King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332.
142. Friedland, supra note 34, at 209.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 197.

Spring 2019]

Grover

45

in the instructions or the overall meaning, disabling the jurors from
adequately applying those instructions of the evidence in a case.”145
Even information the sentencing actor does not currently have
is more readily available to the judge than the jurors. 146 This
information gap is largely a result of differing levels of legal
education among jurors and judges and of different procedural
mechanisms that allow judges to receive information jurors cannot
receive.147 Additionally, this information gap stems from the nature
of the judge’s role in the criminal justice system. While judges are
exposed to more violent crimes and can likely better evaluate where
the defendant and crime fit on a criminal culpability scale, “a juror
sentencing for the very first time likely views each offender as the
worst criminal she’s ever seen.”148 As a result, this gap often leads
jurors to make sentencing decisions based on irrelevant and
arbitrary factors rather than those factors required by law and laid
out in complicated jury instructions.149
IV. ENCOURAGING JURY RESPONSIBILITY
Study after study has shown that capital jurors do not feel
responsible for the sentences they choose to impose.150 This lack of
responsibility prevents jurors from appreciating the weight of the
decisions they make and leads juries to decide cases based on
arbitrary factors. The procedures that deny information and clarity
to capital jurors insulate them from feeling this sense of
responsibility. Those same procedures are utilized to deny
information and clarity to non-capital jurors, allowing them to also
abdicate responsibility for the sentences they impose. Just as this
lack of responsibility is problematic for capital jurors, it is
problematic for non-capital jurors who may consider arbitrary
factors to make their sentencing decision. Here, I propose a solution
to this problem that would ensure that non-capital jurors are not able
to abdicate responsibility for the choices they make.
145. Id.; Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 16, at 9; Haney, supra note 13, at 1483.
146. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. § 37.07 (2018) (allowing the judge to
order a presentencing report, while jurors may not).
147. Id.; King & Noble, supra note 4, at 357–58.
148. See King, supra note 6, at 207.
149. King & Noble, supra note 4, at 344.
150. Bowers & Steiner, supra note 11, at 320.
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A. Increase Jury Activism
As previously discussed, clear and unambiguous information is
key to getting a jury engaged in a sentencing hearing and
subsequently helping them feel the weight of their decision in that
hearing. An active jury is a responsible jury that produces reliable
sentences.151 There are many possible ways to create an engaged
and responsible jury. They range from attempting to create an
attentive jury who understands what is going on, to training the jury,
to clarifying instructions for the jury as they make their ultimate
decision. A combination of these methods is critical to ensuring that
juries feel responsible for the sentences they impose. By utilizing a
combination of these mechanisms, the court can ensure that if one
method of engagement does not reach a juror, another method may.
The challenge of creating an environment that promotes an
attentive jury is like the challenge all teachers face as they try to
create an environment in which their students can learn and focus.
Important in an educational context is note taking and asking
questions. 152 Such methods should likewise be utilized in the
courtroom.153 Studies have demonstrated the value in taking notes
by hand in a classroom.154 By allowing jurors to take notes, such
value can also be realized in the courtroom and jurors can better
focus on the issues at hand. Additionally, “since jurors are the ones
entrusted with the responsibility of resolving issues, it appears
151. Friedland, supra note 34, at 192 (“This more active jury role is intended
to provide juries with an authority commensurate with their responsibility for
resolving issues at trial. Proponents contend that the active jury model would
encourage juries to become more attentive and responsible through increased
participation in the process.”).
152. The Importance of Note-Taking, CAMBRIDGE NETWORK (Apr. 18, 2017),
https://www.cambridgenetwork.co.uk/news/the-importance-of-note-taking/
[https://perma.cc/A4RU-YLPS] (citing the benefits of notetaking as assisting
memory, helping comprehension, providing a useful record, and providing a
platform for writing.); Ronald D. Vale, The Value of Asking Questions, 24(6)
MOL. BIOL. CELL 680, 681 (2013) (“Virtually all educators agree that teaching . .
. should involve more inquiry-based learning and less fact-based
memorization.”).
153. Friedland, supra note 34, at 204.
154 . Joseph R. Boyle & Gina A. Forchelli, Note-Taking, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES
(Apr.
28,
2017),
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com
/view/document/obo9780199756810/obo-9780199756810-0110.xml
[https://perma.cc/LR92-UGGK].

Spring 2019]

Grover

47

logical to at least permit the jury to supplement – with the
framework of limitations prescribed by the process, such as the rules
of evidence – the questioning of witnesses.” 155 Such questions
would certainly need to be limited and most likely funneled through
the judge, but the value of creating engaged and responsible jurors
outweighs the minor administrative burden that might result from
such questioning. Allowing jurors to think critically about the things
they are told and ask questions when they have them will surely help
them be active and invested participants in the trial the same way
such strategies help students be active and invested participants in
their classrooms.
B. Increase Juror Comprehension and Understanding
In addition to encouraging jurors to be active participants in the
trial, the court should train jurors on what to do when they face
significant problems or have procedural questions. As previously
discussed, jurors do not have the legal expertise the judge or the
attorneys in the case have, but this lack of practical experience
should not be a bar to enabling a juror to take responsibility for their
choices. Thus, special trainings for jurors on how to engage with the
case are critical. These trainings would cover topics like how and in
what scenarios juror questions, like those proposed above, would be
appropriate. Trainings would also provide jurors with information
on “how to do its job, particularly in resolving disputes and avoiding
deadlocks.”156 These trainings would also teach jurors what to do in
the case of a hung jury and what having a hung jury actually means
in the jurisdiction they are in. Such trainings would have no
substantive legal component or implications but would simply
provide procedural guidance to juries that may allow them to
function more effectively.
Finally, revised jury instructions “should focus on reducing
complexity and communicating clearly the sentencer’s awesome
obligation to make an irreducible moral judgment about the
defendant’s fate.”157 Jury instructions should be clarified so they are
more easily understood by jurors who do not have the legal
experience.158 It should not be the case that
155.
156.
157.
158.

Friedland, supra note 34, at 208.
Id. at 204.
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 55, at 404.
Johnson, supra note 78.
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after having heard the sentencing instructions read to them three
times . . . almost a third [of jurors tested] provided definitions [of
mitigation] that border on being uninterpretable or incoherent, and
slightly more than one subject on hand was so mystified by the
concept that he or she was unable to venture a guess as to its
meaning.159

Clarity and unambiguity are key to increasing juror
comprehension in this regard.160
Jury instructions should be explicit about the issues the jury
should consider and what the jury’s responsibilities are. Jurors
should be explicitly and regularly instructed “that the decision they
are about to make is, despite its legal trappings, a moral one and
that, in the absence of legal error, their judgement will be final.”161
They should also be explicitly informed that the responsibility for
the sentence they impose belongs to them, and only them. Jurors
who are contemplating sentences for defendants should have to
acknowledge that the sentence they choose to impose has an impact
on that defendant’s life, and in considering that impact, they should
have to acknowledge that the choice they make is one for which
they bear responsibility. Furthermore, “sentencing guidelines for
juries, instructions to jurors requiring that they find certain
aggravating facts before high-end sentences can be imposed, or
even more rigorous appellate review might help to standardized jury
sentencing in non-capital cases.”162
Repetition is also important to increasing juror
comprehension.163 People retain information the more they hear it,
the more they see it, and the more they have to wrestle with it. 164
159. Haney, supra note 13, at 1484.
160. Id. at 1483 (“Psychologists know generally that, ‘through convoluted
verbiage, destructive conduct is made benign and people who engage in it are
relieved of a sense of personal agency.’ Yet the convoluted verbiage of the capital
jury instructions distances jurors from the realities of the impending decision.”).
161. Eisenberg et al., supra note 69, at 379–80.
162. King, supra note 6, at 197.
163. Focus & Repetition in Learning, APL NEXTED (2018), https://aplnexted.com/blog/best-practices-for-teaching/Focus-and-Repetition-in-Learning
[https://perma.cc/YC8R-VRJG] (“Repetition is a key learning aid because it
helps transition a skill from the conscious to the subconscious.”).
164. Id.
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Thus, jury instructions should be given early in the trial and repeated
throughout the sentencing stage of the trial. They should not be
reserved for only the end of the sentencing argument. By providing
jurors with their instructions early and repeatedly, jurors can filter
the testimony they hear through the lens of the law they learned
from the jury instructions. When a juror knows why they are
listening to something and what its relevance is, they are more likely
to retain that information and to be more readily able to apply it.165
Because so much of the lack of responsibility felt by jurors for the
sentences they impose is a result of unclear expectations and
ambiguous information provided to jurors, it is obvious that no plan
to address such lack of responsibility would be complete without
attempting to address the expectation and information gap that
prevents the jury from being fully informed.
Utilizing some iteration of all of these techniques to combat the
lack of responsibility felt by jurors in non-capital sentencing is
critical to address the information gap that feeds such lack of
responsibility. Because a lack of information is the primary
motivating factor behind the lack of responsibility in non-capital
cases, providing jurors every tool to secure such information is
critical. With such information comes the autonomy to make a
choice and the ultimate responsibility for such choice. “If the
ultimate responsibility for the outcome of a case lies with the jury,
the responsibility should be complemented by a corollary predicate
freedom of the jury to have some input, albeit regulated, into
deciding what information is necessary for the jury to resolve
relevant issues.”166 There is no just reason why then the court should
continue to deny the jury information that could aid them in
producing a just result. The strongest argument against
implementing such procedures is the increased administrative
burden such mechanisms may create. However, if the goal of the
criminal justice system is promoting justice, then providing juries
with the information they need to make informed and responsible
sentencing choices can only advance such a goal.

165. See Barbara Oakley, Science Says This is the Best Way to Learn and
Remember New Things, FORBES (July 8, 2016, 2:37 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2016/07/08/science-says-this-is-the-bestway-to-learn-and-remember-new-things/#1c762b4a3ea2d
[https://perma.cc/5Y7D-2TM3].
166. Friedland, supra note 34, at 209.
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V. CONCLUSION
In order for sentences to be just, someone must wrestle with the
implications of a sentence on both the defendant and the
community. In states where juries are used in the sentencing of
defendants, the jury is that someone who must be accountable for
the implications of the sentence they choose to impose. This sense
of responsibility should lead to sentences that are no harsher or more
arbitrary than need be within the constitutional framework that
requires an individualized assessment of culpability in
sentencing. 167 In reality though, jurors are not encouraged or
enabled to assume a sense of responsibility for their decisions.
The lack of responsibility felt by the non-capital jury is a stain
on the jury as an institution. The jury was intended to be a bulwark
against governmental overreach,168 but in reality, the jury is denied
the information and power they need to be such a defense. Until
such a time in which the jury is given the power and the information
needed to decide cases responsibly and non-arbitrarily, the
institution will retain its current stain. In order to combat such a
problem, it is critical to create an attentive jury, to train the jury, and
to fully inform the jury. Taking such steps will help establish an
informed and involved jury, and an informed and involved jury is a
responsible jury that recognizes the impact of the choices they are
making.

167.
168.

King & Noble, supra note 4, at 332.
Oregon, 555 U.S. at 168.

